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aThe evolution of speech and language has been areturning topic in the language sciences since theso-called “cognitive revolution.” Eric Lenneberg’s
(1967) monograph, The Biological Foundations of Language,
monumentally marks the beginning of this tradition. It
presents an extensive treatment on the evolution and genetics
of language. According to Lenneberg, our innate propensity
to acquire language is rooted in “species-specific cognitive
propensities” (p. 374). There is evidence, he argued,“that cognitive function is a more basic and primary
process than language, and that the dependence
relationship of language upon cognition is incomparably
stronger than vice versa.” (p. 374)This species-specific propensity was called “universal
grammar”:“universal grammar is of a unique type, common to
all men, and it is entirely the by-product of peculiar
modes of cognition based upon the biological condition
of the individual.” (p. 377)And:“all languages are so constructed as to conform to
the stringent requirements imposed upon them by
cerebral language data processing mechanisms.”
(p. 377)This evolutionary priority of cognitive capacities,
such as “modes of categorization, the capacity of extractingritus, Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics,
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its “time limitations on the rate of input,” and “storage
capacities” (p. 375), is precisely what, half a century later,
is claimed by Christiansen and Chater (2016) in their
important book Creating Language:Disclos
of public
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9, Term“natural languages exist only because humans can
produce, process and learn them. In order for languages
to be passed on from generation to generation, they
must adapt to the properties of the human learning
and processing mechanisms.” (p. 42)And:“the pressures working on language to adapt
to humans are significantly stronger than the selection
pressures on humans to use language: a language
can only survive if it is learnable and can be processed
by humans.” (p. 42)Regrettably, the authors do not cite Lenneberg on
this point, who had been the originator of this idea.
Christiansen and Charter’s approach is to consider
the processing, acquisition, and evolution of language, each
operating on a different time scale, as closely intertwined.
To begin understanding language,“we must look at its origins. That is, we must consider
how language is created: moment by moment, in the
generation and understanding of individual utterances;
year by year, as new language learners acquire the
skill of generating and understanding; and generation
by generation, as languages change, split and fuse,
through processes of cultural evolution, from what
we imagine to be the rudimentary communicative
systems of our far distant ancestors to the richness
and diversity of natural languages today.” (p. xi)This is a laudable, innovative approach, but the
authors show no awareness of the fact that this approach,ure: The author has declared that no competing interests existed at the time
ation.
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which I have called the “genetic stance” (Levelt, 2016),
was the dominant perspective of language scientists since
the middle of the 18th and all over the 19th century of which
Levelt (2014) presents an extensive overview. According
to this perspective, language can only be understood from
its origins, its genesis, and this genesis is three pronged:
There is, first, the genesis of language/speech in the
speaker’s mind. I have called this the microgenesis of
language (Levelt, 1989). There is, second, the ontogenesis
of language, the emergence of speech and language during
our first years of life. There is, third, the phylogenesis of
language, the evolution of language in primordial homo
sapiens and its further cultural evolution in the world’s
language families.
Here is, for instance, Wilhelm von Humboldt’s (1827)
formulation of the genetic stance. Language is not a product
(Ergon), according to von Humboldt, but an activity
(Energeia):“Hence, its true definition can only be a genetic one.
It is namely the ever repeated labor of the mind, to
enable the articulated sound to express the thought.”
(p. 192)Language is what the speaker does, a process extending
over time, the microgenesis of speech. This genetic stance
invited two perspectives on the evolution of speech. The
first one is to consider phylogenesis, that is, evolution, from
the perspective of ontogenesis: What can the emergence of
speech in the child tell us about the emergence of speech in
our human species? The second one is to explain this emer-
gence of speech from microgenetic processes in our primordial
ancestors. What were they doing to express themselves? In
the following, I will consider some highlights of these early
ontogenetic and microgenetic perspectives on the evolution
of speech.The Ontogenetic Perspective—Charles de Brosses
Charles de Brosses (1765; 1709–1777), man of letters
from Dyon and contributor to Diderot’s enyclopedia, was
the first to develop the ontogenetic perspective, in much
detail, in his surprisingly well-conceived two-volume work
on etymology in 1765.
It is never the case that a really new language appears,
according to de Brosses. All languages are alterations of
older, preceding languages. This is obvious in western lan-
guages that are all related to one another. The natural question
to ask is: What language, spoken by the original “unique
family,” was the source of this branching family tree? Most
regrettably, this “language primitive,” the roots of all later
words, cannot be reconstructed. All resemblance has been
lost in the course of history. There is no proof, whatsoever,
that any existing language, such as Hebrew, is the original one.
To discover the origins of language, we better focus
on those who begin to speak, “ce sont les enfants.” Onto-
genesis reveals the origins of phylogenesis. The first causes
of vocal expression in the child are internal feelings and
sensations. These interjections are entirely mechanical productsDownloaded from: https://pubs.asha.org Max Planck Institut on 09/04/201of our vocal organs, common to infants of all peoples. They
are direct, nonmediated expressions of primary sentiments,
such as pain, surprise, disgust, and aversion. Different senti-
ments excite different speech organs. Pain excites the
“basses cordes,” the base vocal cords; the interjection is
glottal, aspired, and drawn out. Aversion is expressed by
the front end of vocal apparatus, the lips. That is because
it is not only expression of sentiment, but also of movement,
action, and repulsion, as in pouah! and so on for the other
primitive sentiments. de Brosses called this the “premier
ordre” of vocal expressions in the child.
The “second order” is equally “mechanical”; it is the
bilabial babbling of all infants. These meaningless syllables
are the first roots in all languages. They are not imitations;
they are not conventional. The bilabial babbles are followed
by dental ones. de Brosses was the first to review the words
for mommy and daddy in a large range of languages, show-
ing that they are all based on these labial and dental babbles.
The third order contains a number of “almost necessary
words.” They are the names for our speech organs. They
are derived from using these organs: bouche, dent, langue,
and gorge. This often holds in other languages as well.
The fourth and quite extensive order is the words
that paint. They are based on our universal, natural capacity
of imitation. The child imitates “le bruit qui a frappé son
orielle”; this is an onoma-topée, which is the original primi-
tive form of composing names. This important source of
name-giving in the primitive language is, again, a necessary
“mechanical” outcome of the “physics of things,” the sounds
objects make, the functioning of our ear, and the natural
capacity of vocal imitation:9, Term“Nothing is more common and more natural than
names for objects coined after the sound they make
to the ear.” (de Brosses, 1765, Vol. I, p. 233)In support of this thesis, de Brosses presents extensive
tables of onomatopoeic words in various languages.
The closely related fifth order is what we now call
sound symbolism. These words express certain modalities
of entities, such as fixity. The expression of fixity makes
use of the most fixed vocal organ, the teeth, preferably in
words beginning with “st” as in stella, stabilité, and struc-
ture. There is the modality of fluidity as in flambeau, flute.
And so on for other modalities. These are entirely natural
causes of commonalities among languages, languages that
may be entirely unrelated.
The sixth order of natural expression is called “accent”
by de Brosses. It is closely related to the first order, the
interjections. We can speak any words with a particular
accent: “On peut dire qu’ils sont l’ame des mots” (de Brosse,
1765, Vol. I, pp. 254–255). They express the speaker’s sin-
cerity and the way the speaker is affected.
The seventh order, finally, provides the metaphorical
extensions that guide further lexical derivations. They are
all based on similarities. To call a flower “oeillet” is because
of its resemblance to the eye. This metaphoric similarity
works deep into our vocabularies and into the further conven-
tionalization of a language. de Brosses uses this sameLevelt: How Speech Evolved 2927
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Table 1. Schultze’s (1880) table of consonants.
Plosives Resonants Fricatives Trills
Lips p, b m f, (v), w r (labial)
Tongue t, d n l, s, sch r (lingual)
Palate k, g ng ch, j r (palatal)mechanism of metaphoric similarity to explain the coining
of abstract, intellectual terms in cultivated languages.
In short, our children reveal the basic shape of our pri-
mordial language from which phylogeny proceeds. Ontogeny
is our window on the roots of phylogeny. These roots are en-
tirely “mechanical” in de Brosses’ terminology. It is a “faculté
naturelle” (de Brosses, 1765, Vol. I, p. 2), a God-given faculty.
de Brosses’ insightful treatise was soon forgotten,
but the ontogenetic perspective on the evolution of speech
and language survived till the present day. The following
three sections will consider some 19th-century developments
in this respect.The Ontogenetic Perspective—Steinthal and Schultze
The Berlin philosopher and linguist Heymann Steinthal
(1823–1899) was deeply influenced by Wilhelm von Humboldt
and his “genetic stance.” In his first major work (Steinthal,
1855), he claimed that “the essence of language is identical
to its origin.”2928“In just the same way as any embryo builds this or
that organ during a particular phase of development,
at some definite point the mind necessarily builds
language, today, as in primeval era.” (Steinthal,
1855, p. 232)Steinthal clearly expresses the ontogenetic perspective:“the laws that are still today operative in the child’s
acquisition of language, were also the driving forces
in the invention of language.” (p. 22)But, as we will consider below, Steinthal especially
elaborated von Humboldt’s microgenetic perspective.
Fritz Schultze (1880; 1846–1908), philosopher and
pedagogue in Dresden, was probably the first to develop
the ontogenetic perspective for the evolution of our speech
sound repertoire, in his 1880 paper entitled Die Sprache des
Kindes. The paper opens with this rhetorical question:“… but doesn’t the miracle of recruiting language
confront us anew in any child? Couldn’t one reconceive,
in the developmental process of individual life, the
fluid phenomena, which long since rushed by in the
stream of universal development?” (p. 23)Schultze then went into interesting detail. He proposed
a “principle of minimal effort,” which governs the order in
which speech sounds are acquired in children and, by
hypothesis, in the evolution of speech. He worked this out
for both the acquisition of vowels and of consonants. Here
is his treatment of consonant acquisition, which he summa-
rized in Table 1:
First considering the vertical dimension, the place of
articulation: According to Schultze, the physiological effort
increases from lip- to tongue- to palate/guttural-speech
sounds. And indeed, Schultze claims that is the order in which
these speech sounds appear in the child.
Second, considering the horizontal dimension, the
manner of articulation, for lips and tongue physiologicalJournal of Speech, Language, and Hearing Research • Vol. 62 •
Downloaded from: https://pubs.asha.org Max Planck Institut on 09/04/201effort, increases from left to right, that is, from plosives to
trills.
But for palatal speech sounds, effort increases in
the opposite direction, from order of palatal r to plosives
k and g.
And again, Schultze claims, these directions conform
to the acquisition in the child. Schultze admits that far
better data are needed than what he was able to collect from
the limited number of sources available.
In discussing these orders of acquisition, Schultze
makes occasional reference to the evolution of speech. His
approach reflects the Zeitgeist. The world’s peoples are in
different stages of mental development, and so are their
languages. Among the least developed ones are pacific
“dialects,” such as Rimatara. They have just a few consonants,
the easy ones from the left side of the table. The Naturvölker,
different from European peoples, also reduplicate as all
children do, in mama, papa for instance. And when Natur-
menschen, such as from Tahiti and the Maori, try to pro-
nounce European words, they simplify them to fit their own




Relating ontogenesis and phylogenesis got another
twist just a few years before Schultze’s (1880) paper. The
occasion was Ernst Haeckel’s (1874) book Anthropogenie.
At the time, Haeckel (1834–1919) from Jena University was
an already famous zoologist and naturalist. He had picked
up Etienne Serre’s idea of ontogeny recapitulating phylogeny.
In fact, Haeckel had introduced both terms ontogeny and
phylogeny. This recapitulation theory became known as
Haeckel’s “biogenetic law.” An organism’s development is
like an accelerated film of the evolutionary states that had
preceded the species. In his 1874 book, Haeckel generalized
his law to mental development:2926–2
9, Term“the mental development of every child is only a short
recapitulation of that long phylogenetic process.”
(p. 706)This was quickly picked up by child language re-
searchers. Hippolyte Taine (1877), for instance, wrote in his
Mind paper:“Speaking generally, the child presents in a passing
state the mental characteristics that are found in a
fixed state in primitive civilizations, very much as the
human embryo presents in a passing state the physical931 • August 2019
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characteristics that are found in a fixed state in the
classes of inferior animals.” (p. 259)With Taine, many students of language acquisition
uncritically approved this tacit move from biological to
cultural evolution. Like Schultze, developmentalists Perez,
Preyer, Gutzman, Sully, and Ament all saw parallels between
the child’s predilection for easy speech sounds and the speech
sound repertoire of so-called “primitive” languages. Like
“natural peoples,” children replace fricatives by plosives,
they use click sounds (Gutzmann, 1897), they reduplicate,
they have very limited vocabularies like the Iroquois whose
language has just “a few words” (Chamberlain, 1893), and
they only have concrete words, lacking general concepts,
and so forth.
But others expressed doubts about this biogenetic
law. Why would children repeat the stages of civilization?
Why would these have become genetically endowed in the
child? That sounds very Lamarckian, our acquired traits
tending to become genetic. And indeed, Haeckel, who had
met Charles Darwin and knew his work, remained a pro-
nounced Lamarckian.
Darwin’s brilliant young friend George Romanes (1889)
made this a topic in his Mental Evolution in Man. Today’s
infant, Romanes argues, “is born into the medium of already
spoken language.” Let me cite him in full:“The infant, as a child of to-day, finds a grammar
already made to its use,… But the infant,… in primeval
time, was under the necessity of slowly elaborating
his grammar… and this,…., he only could do by the
aid of gesture and grimace. Therefore, while the
acquisition of names and forms of speech by infantile
man must have been thus in chief part dependent on
gesture and grimace, the acquisition by the infantile
child is now not only independent of gesture and
grimace, but actively inimical to both…hence, so soon
as a child of to-day begins to speak, gesture-signs begin
at once to be starved out by grammatical forms.”
(pp. 329–330)In other words, children have no reason to fully “re-
capitulate” the phylogeny of speech/language. They can
practically skip the gestural precursor of speech, which took
eras in the evolution of our progenitors, according to
Romanes.
The subsequent stage, however, in language evolution,
the development of the articulatory mode, still shows re-
semblances in ontogeny. Here, Romanes was much inspired
by the ethnolinguist Horatio Hale (1886).
The Ontogenetic Perspective—Horatio Hale
and the Child’s Language Instinct
The American-Canadian anthropologist and linguist
Horatio Hale (1817–1896) published, in 1886, an innovative
paper on the causes of language diversity.
How come languages are so diverse? Hale rejects the
untenable theory that all languages are rooted in the speech
of one primordial community, with eras of dispersion causingDownloaded from: https://pubs.asha.org Max Planck Institut on 09/04/201the now prevailing diversity. But how come that there are
no less than 12 and probably 30 distinct, totally unrelated
language stocks in Oregon alone? (Note that “Oregon”
then denoted northwestern America.) Or did these equally
complex and fully developed languages arise indepen-
dently and more or less simultaneously, as another theory
proclaims? All this is most unlikely. Hale (1886) then proposed
his own alternative:9, Term“briefly then, the plain conclusion to which all the
observations point with irresistible force is, that the
origin of linguistic stocks is to be found in what may
be termed the language-making instinct of very young
children.” (p. 285)Notice that this is exactly what de Brosses had pro-
posed 120 years earlier, but that had meanwhile been lost
on the linguistic community. However, Hale could support
his theory with a new type of empirical argument. Hale
cited various reports on what we now call idioglossia, the
“home speech” sometimes developed by twins or other
children growing up closely together and much left to them-
selves. Without much input from the environment, children
start talking anyway; “they sometimes invent a complete
language, sufficient for all purposes of mutual intercourse”
(Hale, 1886, p. 285). But how can this have worked, children
creating a new language in evolution? Here is a primordial
tribe with a fully developed spoken language. How can their
prelinguistic children get away and start for themselves in the
next valley? Here, Hale comes with an ingenious solution:“If a single pair, man and wife, should wander off
into an inhabited region, and there, after a few years,
both perish, leaving a family of young children to
grow up by themselves and frame their own speech,
…this speech might, and probably would, be an entirely
novel language….
The natural disposition of the oldest child, indeed,
would be to yield to the youngest in this regards….
The baby-talk, the “children’s language,” would
become the mother-tongue of the new community.”
(p. 297)The same mechanism may have worked for a single
widow, left alone with her infants. Baby-talk would remain
her only language (pp. 299–300).
Hale presents extensive examples of baby-talk, demon-
strating its lack of inflections, parts of speech, function
words, and its very limited vocabulary. All these features
have to be created anew, based on the children’s “language
instinct.” This, Hale argues, can work in rich climates,
where such bands of children have a chance to survive. It
explains the proliferation of language families in tropical
regions. Here, then, is Hale’s (1886) ontogenetic perspec-
tive in a nutshell:“Briefly then, the plain conclusion to which all
the observations point with irresistible force is, that
the origin of linguistic stocks is to be found in the
language making instinct of very young children.”
(p. 285)Levelt: How Speech Evolved 2929
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The Microgenetic Perspective—From von Humboldt
to Steinthal
von Humboldt’s microgenetic stance, cited above,
was much elaborated by Heymann Steinthal (1871, 1881). If
language is what the speaker does, the origins of language
should be traced back to the mental processes underlying
the first vocal activities of our primordial ancestors. This
would need “eine entwickelte Psychologie,” but not much
of that was available in Steinthal’s time. Steinthal adopted
Johann Friedrich Herbart’s (1816) theory of “mental
mechanics,” but also the “reflex theory” of Hermann Lotze
(1852), Herbart’s successor in Koenigsberg, who hated
mental mechanics. Steinthal did not hesitate to bridge the
gap in developing his microgenetic theory.
Herbart developed a clever mathematical theory of
how ideas, Vorstellungen get in and out of consciousness,
mutually associating or dispelling each other. Herbart
provided the precise differential equations that govern this
“mental mechanics.” The basic idea is quite simple. Con-
sciousness is like a stage. On the stage are one or a few
actors; it cannot contain more. All other actors push to get
onto the stage, using their associations to actors on the
stage and dispelling other actors from the stage. Below
consciousness are conglomerates of associated ideas. New
ideas on the stage are easily drawn into existing con-
glomerates, for instance, by similarity. This process is called
apperception. The conglomerate into which a new idea gets
associated, Herbert calls the apperceptive mass.
Steinthal now argued that what we mostly have on
the stage of our consciousness is words, inner speech. These
inner words are associated to some apperceptive mass
below the stage of consciousness. This unconscious con-
glomerate of ideas is in fact the word’s meaning. We are
never fully conscious of a word’s meaning. What we are
conscious of is the inner word sound and its connection to
the underlying meaning conglomerate. Levelt (2015) showed
that this is exactly what Jackendoff proposed in his 1987
book on consciousness.
How did this originally get set up? Here is our still
speechless ancestor, who suddenly perceives something ex-
citing, say a running chicken. Following Lotze’s theory,
this perceptual nervous excitement will “flow out” through
the nervous system. It could, for instance, release a vocal
sound reflex, such as ah! The image of the chicken and the
image of the self-produced sound reflex are almost simulta-
neous, and they share the “excitement” affect. This affec-
tive similarity between the chicken image and the reflexive
sound image suffices, given Herbart’s theory of association,
to associate the two images in consciousness. Next time,
our ancestor perceives the sound ah!, self- or other-produced,
it will activate the “sleeping” image of the chicken and the
whole conglomerate in which it is embedded. In other words,
ah! in consciousness relates to the chicken conglomerate as
any spoken word relates to its underlying meaning. Linguis-
tically speaking, ah! has become a primitive root word.
We will not further follow Steinthal in developing
this theory in deriving new roots from existing roots or in2930 Journal of Speech, Language, and Hearing Research • Vol. 62 •
Downloaded from: https://pubs.asha.org Max Planck Institut on 09/04/201sketching the evolution of the sentence, the first steps in
relating a subject to a predicate. They were quite innovative
moves in largely unexplored area.The Microgenetic Perspective—Wilhelm Wundt
In the year 1900, Wilhelm Wundt, not only the fa-
ther of experimental psychology but also the father of psy-
cholinguistics, published his two-volume Die Sprache. The
deep motivation for writing this work was to account for
the genesis of language, micro-, onto-, and phylogenesis.
The culminating Chapter 9 reviews the gigantic
literature on language origins. It rejects all existing theo-
ries, including Steinthal’s, and instead proposes a strictly
“gestural theory” of language origins. Wundt (1900) set out to
explain the genesis of speech from the microgenesis of
gesture, “spoken language originally developed with and
from sign language” (Vol. II, p. 637). According to Wundt,
gestural movements are directly expressive of affect, mean-
ing, or thought. We still see this, according to Wundt, in
the mimic and pantomimic gestures, which universally ac-
company the speech of children and of Naturvölker. Sign
language is the universal, natural expressive means of
homo sapiens. It arises spontaneously in any community,
just because it is directly expressive of meaning. In con-
trast, speech sounds have no intrinsic meaning, whatso-
ever; even interjections are not depictive or iconic as
gestures can be.
How then did initially meaningless, arbitrary vocal
expressions take over from these gestures? Here is Wundt’s
microgenetic explanation: It often happens that the larger
pantomimic gesture also flows over into the articulators
(notice the Lotze/Steinthal influence here). They happen to
produce sounds, initially totally meaningless sounds. For
our gesturing primordial ancestors, however, the simulta-
neity of the meaningless sound and the meaningful gesture
created the mental association between that sound and the
gesture, and from there between the sound and the ges-
ture’s iconic meaning. This became the seed from which
speech and spoken languages developed and still develop.
That is, in a nutshell, Wundt’s theory.
Could this have worked? Did the activity of sponta-
neous meaningful gesturing with some frequency “flow
over” into the voicing apparatus of early prespeech homo
sapiens? We will never know, but recent work by Stephen
Levinson (personal communication, 2017) seems to support
Wundt’s idea. Levinson recorded and analyzed a lengthy
communication by a Deaf person, “K,” on Rossel Island
in the South Pacific, which is inhabited by a small totally
isolated community. K does not speak and does not master
a conventional sign language. But K could communicate
fairly effectively by using iconic, pointing, and other ges-
tures, a variety of self-invented “home sign.”
What Levinson observed is almost continuous vocali-
zation accompanying K’s oft-extensive gestures. It is almost
miraculous how Wundt (1900) described this kind of be-
havior, which he most probably never observed himself:2926–2931 • August 2019
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“more energetic gestures are accompanied by more
violent speech gestures.” (p. 608)The speech gestures Levinson observed were indeed
largely guttural/prosodic. They vary in pitch and loudness,
indeed in energy and violence. But they are rarely articula-
tory, varying in place or manner. That may, however, be
the Achilles heel of Wundt’s theory. Being prosodic, it is
unlikely that these voicings will attain fixed associations to
specific meaningful gestures. If that would occur at all, it
would not result in a natural spoken language. Wundt re-
grettably leaves us in the dark about possible mediating
mechanisms.
The Precedence of Cognition in Language Evolution
Wundt’s chapter on language origins brings us back
to Lenneberg and to Christiansen and Chater. Language,
first signed, then spoken, did not suddenly arise accord-
ing to Wundt (1900), but gradually emerged from, and in
interaction with cognition, or in the terminology of the
day, “consciousness”:“The development of human consciousness
necessarily implies the development of expressive
movements, gestures, language.” (p. 635)Both in Wundt’s time and today, gradual, cognition-
based theories dominate. But both then and now, more
abrupt transitions to language have been proposed by re-
spectable scholars. In Wundt’s time, proponents of a genet-
ically based sudden emergence of speech and language
were Horatio Hale (1886), and Thomas Huxley, cited by
Hale. According to them, the third frontal convolution,
containing Broca’s area, had suddenly been enlarged by a
genetic change “of the minutest kind,” making language
possible. Recently, Berwick and Chomsky (2016, p. 79)
claimed a sudden appearance of Merge on which our re-
cursive language capacity is based due to a genetically
caused “slight rewiring of the brain.” Wundt disliked, even
ridiculed, such theories, calling them “miracle theories”
(see Levelt, 2018, for more detail). History keeps repeating
itself, just like the evolution of speech and language.
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